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WHEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS COLLIDE:
GUINN v. COLLINSVILLE CHURCH OF CHRIST
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bill of Rights1 was intended by the framers to prevent "en-
croachments upon the liberties of the people."2 The first amendment
religious freedoms3 were drafted in order to protect against encroach-
ments upon religious liberty, and are central to this country's national
identity. Privacy rights of the individual,4 although not recognized as a
distinct legal concept until this century,5 have gained increasing constitu-
tional,6 judicial,7 and statutory8 protection during the past two decades.
As a new area of the law develops it will often come into conflict
with established legal principles. When such conflicts occur between two
rights recognized under the Constitution, the courts are faced with the
difficult task of determining the interrelationship of those rights.9
An Oklahoma District Court was recently faced with the duty of
deciding between two apparently conflicting constitutional rights. The
case of Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ0 presents the issue of
whether the free exercise rights of a religious congregation constitute a
valid defense to a claim of invasion of privacy. The purpose of this Note
1. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
2. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 152 (4th ed. 1970). The
Antifederalists, chief among them Patrick Henry and Luther Martin, fought for inclusion of the Bill
of Rights in the Constitution for fear that their exclusion would destroy state sovereignty. The
Federalists, led by James Madison and C.C. Pinckney, initially opposed the inclusion of the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 152-53.
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Perfect tolera-
tion of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant of the State shall ever be molested in
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship .
4. See infra notes 57-81 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 64 and note 69 and accompanying text.
9. When two fundamental rights are asserted one against another, the courts are forced to
weigh the respective merits of the rights asserted on a case by case basis. All constitutional rights are
on an equal footing and there is not priority among them. Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 561 (1976). An asserted "fundamental" or "preferred" right under the Constitution can only be
overcome by a compelling state interest. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1000 (1978) (development of strict scrutiny standard).
10. No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa County, Okla. Mar. 15, 1984), appeal docketed, No. 62,154
(Okla. Apr. 16, 1984).
1
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is to examine the verdict in Guinn against the backdrop of tort and con-
stitutional law principles, as well as to anticipate the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's review of the trial court decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Marian Guinn moved to Collinsville, Oklahoma in February of
1974.11 Guinn and her two children moved in with Guinn's sister, a
member of the Collinsville Church of Christ, and began attending wor-
ship services at the Church.12 Guinn eventually became a member of the
Church.13
After obtaining her certificate of high school equivalency, Guinn
started college studies in nursing. 14 Upon obtaining her degree, Guinn
accepted a job as a nurse in nearby Tulsa which caused her to stop at-
tending Sunday worship services on a regular basis."
At some point during late 1979 or early 1980 Guinn, a divorcee
herself, began dating a divorced man by the name of Pat Sharp. 6 One of
the Elders of the Church1 7 heard a rumor that Guinn had been the cause
of Sharp's divorce. 8 The Elders of the Churches of Christ believe that
they are obligated by their religion to approach members regarding spiri-
tual problems and to discuss those problems with the affected parties.' 9
They are responsible for the souls of the congregation.20 With these du-
ties in mind, the Elders met with Guinn to discuss the situation, and the
Elders decided that the proper action would be for Guinn to cease seeing
11. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 1, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No. 62,154 (Okla.
Apr. 16, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Brief in Chief of Appellants at 6, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No. 62,154
(Okla. Apr. 16, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants].
15. Id at 7.
16. Id at 8; Brief for Appellee at 1-2, Guinn.
17. The term "Elder" is derived from three Greek words found in the Bible: Presbyteros, mean-
ing "older one" or "elder"; Episcopus, meaning "overseer" or "bishop"; and Poimen, meaning "shep-
herd." The Elders are not official office holders, but rather serve as examples for the congregation
and have the added responsibility to watch over the congregation. The Collinsville Church of Christ
has three Elders. These Elders were chosen by a special committee within the Church. Nominees
for consideration by this committee must possess special spiritual and leadership traits as set forth in
I Timothy and Titus. Interview with Ralph Hunter, Minister of the Collinsville, Oklahoma Church
of Christ, in Collinsville, Oklahoma (February 16, 1985); see also Testimony of Ron Witten, Trial
Transcript at 268, Guinn; Testimony of Ted Moody, Trial Transcript at 366-67, Guinn.
18. Brief for Appellee at 2, Guinn; Brief for Appellants at 8, Guinn.








After their intial meeting, the Elders confronted Guinn several more
times during 1980 and 1981 regarding her relationship with Sharp.2 2
The Elders told Guinn that she was violating scripture and must repent
for her sins of fornication.23 The Elders informed Guinn that according
to scripture they would have to tell her sins to the Church if she contin-
ued to refuse to repent.24
The Elders state that their decision to inform the Church was made
in accordance with the disciplinary procedure contained in Matthew. 25
The Elders were apparently following the four step process spelled out
therein which states:
Jesus said that if your brother sins against you, you should go to him
privately asking him to repent. If he refuses, you should go back with
one or two witnesses. If he still refuses to repent, you should tell it to
the Church. If he refuses to repent even then, you should ... have no
association at all [with him].2
At any time during this four step process, and even after the withdrawal
of fellowship, the recalcitrant party may repent by recognizing the
wrongful nature of his acts and ceasing to commit such acts.2 7 Upon
such repentance, the party can rejoin the congregation.28
Guinn responded to the Elders' demands by writing a letter to the
Elders in which she stated that she withdrew her membership from the
Church and specifically told the Elders not to mention her name in
Church except to say that she had withdrawn her membership there-
from.29 The Elders informed Guinn that she could not withdraw her
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 8-11.
23. Id. at 11. Fornication is derived from the Greek word porneia, which means "sexual immo-
rality." F. YEAKLEY, IN DEFEN SE OF CHURCH DISCIPLINE 8 (1984). Fornication, according to the
Bible, includes "all sexual intercourse between people who are not lawfully married to each other."
Id. (citing I Corinthians 5:1). Although Oklahoma has no fornication statute, local ordinances and
court interpretation make penile-vaginal intercourse between persons married to one another the
only legal sexual activity in the State. Comment, Criminal Law: An Examination of the Oklahoma
Laws Concerning Sexual Behavior, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 459, 459 (1970).
24. Brief for Appellee at 5, Guinn; Brief for Appellants at 8-11, Guinn.
25. Matthew 18:15-17.
26. F. YEAKLEY, supra note 23, at 7 (citing Matthew 18:15-17).
27. Interview with Ralph Hunter, supra note 17. For a discussion of the withdrawal of fellow-
ship, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
28. Interview with Ralph Hunter, supra note 17.
29. Brief for Appellee at 6, Guinn. Guinn's letter stated in part:
I do not want my name mentioned before the Church except to tell them that I withdraw
my membership immediately! I have never fully accepted your doctrine and never will.
Anything I told you was told in confidence and not meant for anyone else to hear. You
have no right to get up and say anything against me in Church than someone would at
work get up before the nursing staff and administration and say something that would be
1985]
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membership from the Church and, according to their beliefs, she would
always be a member.3"
The following Sunday, September 27, 1981, a letter was read by the
Elders to the congregation asking them to pray for and to contact Guinn
so that she would have a "penitent heart"."1 The letter further stated
that if Guinn did not respond by the next Sunday, another letter would
be read detailing the scriptures which Guinn had violated and thereafter
the congregation would "withdraw fellowship" from Guinn. 2 Guinn
did not respond, so the second letter and the scriptures which Guinn had
violated were read to the congregation on October 4, 1981.11 This letter
was mailed to four other Churches of Christ in the area. 4 Fellowship
was then withdrawn from Guinn by the congregation.35
Guinn filed an action against the Church and Elders on October 26,
1981, claiming damages for defamation. 36 Guinn later amended her peti-
tion to state two invasion of privacy claims and a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.3 7 Guinn decided to drop the defamation
harmful and detrimental and embarrassing to me and my family ... . I have no choice
but for all of us to attend another church, another denomination!
Letter from Marian Guinn to the Elders of the Collinsville, Oklahoma Church of Christ (Sept. 24,
1981). Guinn wrote the letter upon advice from a local attorney. This attorney had earlier written a
letter to the Elders cautioning them that they would be subject to a lawsuit if they took any action
violative of Guinn's legal rights. The Elders informed Guinn that the attorney's letter was irrelevant
because this was a Church matter. Brief for Appellee at 6, Guinn.
30. Brief for Appellants at 5, Guinn. One becomes a "member of the body of Christ" when he
embraces Christ's teachings. Interview with Ralph Hunter, supra note 17 (citing I Corinthians
12:27). Roughly stated-once a Christian, always a Christian. This is not to say that Guinn was not
free to stop associating with the Congregation. The Elders' actions after Guinn's letter of September
24, 1981 were not based upon Guinn's association rights, or lack thereof, but rather upon the well
being of the entire Congregation. See infra note 34.
31. See Brief for Appellants at 11, Guinn.
32. Id. "Christians should 'mark', or 'take note of' those who cause divisions and offences
contrary to the doctrine. . . and 'turn away from them' or 'avoid them'." F. YEAKLEY, supra note
23, at 7 (citing Romans 16:17).
33. Brief for Appellants at 11, Guinn.
34. Reply Brief of Appellants at 5, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No. 62,154 (Okla.
Apr. 16, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief for Appellants]. These four churches were located in
Ramona, Skiatook, Oolagah, and Owasso, Oklahoma. The second letter was read, and copies were
mailed to the above churches in order to "[p]rotect the church from the corrupting influence of the
sinner and to protect the influence of the church in the community." F. YEAKLEY, supra note 23, at
II (citing I Corinthians 5:1-13). Although Guinn stated that she withdrew as a member of the
Church, the Elders believed that they were obligated under the scriptures to "protect the flock" by
reading the second letter to the Congregation. Interview with Ralph Hunter, supra note 17. Copies
of this letter were mailed to the other churches because there were members of those churches who
had been members of the Collinsville Church when Guinn was a member there. Brief for Appellants
at 3, Guinn.
35. Brief for Appellants at 11, Guinn.
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id See infra notes 54-175 and accompanying text.
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claim since the charges of fornication were true. 8
The trial court jury returned a verdict awarding damages to Guinn
on all three claims,3 9 and the judgment entered on the verdict was ap-
pealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court by the defendants.4'
B. Procedural History
Guinn filed her initial Petition against the Church and Elders on
October 26, 198 1,41 twenty-two days after the withdrawal of fellowship
by the congregation. Guinn filed her Amended Petition on November
23, 1981 stating the three claims for which she eventually recovered at
trial.42 "The defendants filed a demurrer to plaintiff's petition on De-
cember 29, 1981, which was overruled. Further, defendants filed an Ob-
jection to Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Motion for Summary
Judgment which the District Court overruled on October 15, 1982."4'
The Tulsa County District Court retained jurisdiction over the case and
the defendants responded by filing a writ of prohibition with the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.' When the Oklahoma Supreme Court re-
fused to assume original jurisdiction,45 the defendants applied to the
38. Brief for Appellants at 9-10, Guinn.
39. Id. The jury awarded Guinn the following amounts: Public Disclosure of Private Facts,
$205,000.00 actual damages, $185,000.00 punitive damages; Intrusion Upon Seclusion, $114,000.00
actual damages, $120,000.00 punitive damages; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
$122,000.00 actual damages, $81,000.00 punitive damages. The Court found that the damages
awarded for the three claims overlapped, and that the proper judgment amount was $205,000.00 in
actual damages and $185,000.00 in punitive damages. Brief for Appellee at 10, Guinn; Brief for
Appellants at 12-13, Guinn.
40. Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa County, Okla. Mar.
15, 1984), appeal docketed, No. 62,154 (Okla. Apr. 16, 1984).
41. Petition, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa County,
Okla. Mar. 15, 1984).
42. Amended Petition, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa
County, Okla. Mar. 15,1984).
43. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Church of Christ of Collinsville, Oklahoma v. Graham,
No. 82-1950 (May 31, 1983). See infra notes 186-200 and accompanying text.
44. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-5, Church of Christ of Collinsville, Oklahoma, v. Gra-
ham, No. 82-1950 (May 31, 1983). Prohibition and Mandamus are actions at law in which a higher
court commands a lower court or official to perform or refrain from performing some act. See Wil
v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (mandamus). See generally 16 C. WIGr & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3932 (1977). In Oklahoma, Prohibition and Mandamus
are accomplished by writ. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (Supreme Court); OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 7
(District Courts). Mandamus and Prohibition are extraordinary writs which a court will generally
only issue where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff for which there is no adequate remedy at
law accompanied by a plain legal duty in defendant to act or not to act. See Garner v. City of Tulsa,
651 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1982); Draper v. State, 621 P.2d 1142 (Okla. 1980); Goeppinger v. McIntosh,
376 P.2d 605 (Okla. 1962); McDonald v. Oklahoma Real Estate Comm'n, 268 P.2d 263 (Okla.
1954).
45. Church of Christ of Collinsville, Oklahoma, Allen Cash, Ted Moody, Ron Witten, and
5
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United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari." The United States
Supreme Court denied the defendants' application on October 3, 1983.4,
Discovery was completed by the parties and Pre-Trial Briefs were
submitted on October 28, 1983.48 The Pre-Trial Order was entered on
January 3, 1984.49 Trial was held March 13-15, 1984.50 Defendants filed
their Petition in Error with the Oklahoma Supreme Court on April 16,
1984.51 It is expected that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will hear oral
arguments in late 1985 or early 1986.
C. Issues Presented
The facts of the Guinn case raise several important tort and consti-
tutional law issues. In reaching its decision on appeal, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court will need to define the parameters of the free exercise
clause in relation to privacy rights of the individual. The court will also
have to address the applicability of the defense of qualified privilege to
invasion of privacy claims. The decision on appeal, regardless of how the
issues are determined, may break new ground in the increasingly impor-
tant area of church-state relations.
III. ANALYSIS
In response to the three claims Guinn asserted at trial, 2 the defend-
ants advanced two affirmative defenses to those claims: free exercise of
religion and qualified privilege in tort.53 This Note will discuss the prior
law for each of the claims and defenses separately, followed by an analy-
sis of their respective merits, and possible responses to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's decision on appeal.
Richard Fox v. Tony Graham, District Judge of the 14th Judicial District, No. 59,623 (Okla. Mar.
1, 1983).
46. Church of Christ of Collinsville, Oklahoma v. Graham, No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa
County, Okla. Mar. 15, 1984),petition for cert filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3884 (U.S. May 31, 1983) (No. 82-
1950).
47. Church of Christ of Collinsville, Oklahoma, v. Graham, No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa
County, Okla. Mar. 15, 1984), cert denied, 104 S.Ct. 85 (Oct. 3, 1983) (No. 82-1950) (mem.).
48. Pre-trial Brief, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa
County, Okla. Mar. 15, 1984).
49. Pre-trial Order, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa
County, Okla. Mar. 15, 1984).
50. Journal Entry of Judgment, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No. CT-81-929 (Dist.
Ct. Tulsa County, Okla. Mar. 15, 1984).
51. Petition in Error and Preliminary Statement, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, No.
CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa County, Okla. Mar. 15, 1984).
52. Brief for Appellee at 9, Guinn.
53. Brief for Appellants at 14-36, 41, 54-60, Guinn. See infra notes 176-212 and accompanying
[Vol. 21:157
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A. Theories of Recovery
1. Privacy Claims
Guinn stated two privacy claims in her Amended Petition: intru-
sion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts.5 4 Although
grouped together under the generic term "invasion of privacy", 5 intru-
sion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts are but two of
four separate actions protecting privacy rights. 6
Prior to 1890, no American or English court recognized an express
right to privacy. 7 In their famous article,58 Warren and Brandeis re-
viewed some earlier American and English cases in which relief was af-
forded on the basis of tort, property, or contract law, and concluded that
these decisions were actually based upon the broader right to privacy. 9
The first American decision to accept the right to privacy as an in-
dependent basis for recovery in tort was an unreported decision 6° of a
New York trial judge, who enjoined a newspaper from publishing a pho-
tograph of an actress who "very scandalously appeared on the stage in
tights."61 After enjoying some acceptance in reported decisions,62 the
54. Brief for Appellee at 9, Guinn.
55. The legal concept of "privacy" has been expressed in many ways: "The right to one's
person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone." COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed.
1888); "[T]he interest of the individual in leading, to some reasonable extent, a secluded and private
life, free from the prying eyes, ears and publications of others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652A comment b (1977); "[R]ights of personhood." L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 895. For a com-
prehensive review of privacy rights, see Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
233 (1977).
56. Invasion of privacy is a complex of four torts: intrusion upon seclusion; appropriation of
name or likeness; public disclosure of private facts; and false light. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977). Each separate action protects a different area of privacy rights. An
action for intrusion upon seclusion exists where there is "an intentional interference with [the plain-
tiff's] interest in solitude or seclusion. . . of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
man." Id. § 652B comment a. The action for appropriation of name or likeness protects plaintiffs
from "the appropriation and use of [his] name or likeness to advertise the defendant's business or
product, or for some similar commercial purpose." Id § 652C comment b. An action for public
disclosure of private facts lies where the matter disclosed would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person and is of no legitimate concern to the public. Id § 652D. A false light claim arises where
publicity is given to a matter concerning another which places him in a false light before the public.
Such false light must be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the defendant must have knowl-
edge of the falsity of the matter and the resulting false light, or the defendant must have acted with
reckless disregard as to such falsity. Id § 652E. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEaTON, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984); Gerety, supra note 55; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383
(1960) (a discussion of the privacy causes of action).
57. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 56, at 849.
58. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
59. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 56, at 849.
60. Id. at 850 n.10 (citing Manola v. Stevens).
61. Id.
62. Id (citing Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (D. Mass. 1894) (published photograph
7
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principle was rejected by the courts of Michigan63 and New York."4 Be-
ginning with the acceptance of the Restatement of Torts (Restatement) in
1939, the tide turned in favor of the recognition of privacy rights, and the
cases rejecting the principle were overruled. 5 As of 1980, the right to
privacy is recognized in one form or another in all but one of the states.66The constitutional right to privacy67 is a fairly recent development
in the law. While the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right
to privacy, the United States Supreme Court has recognized privacy as a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.68 The United States
Congress has also recognized the existence of a constitutional right to
privacy. 69
Griswold v. Connecticut7" is the threshold case regarding the consti-
tutional right to privacy. The Griswold opinion represents the still devel-
oping nature of the law surrounding privacy rights and the continuing
state of confusion regarding the scope of those rights. A fragmented plu-
rality of Supreme Court Justices71 attempted to establish a legal and phil-
held to be appropriation of likeness for commercial purposes); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42
N.E. 22 (1895) (erection of statue of deceased person held to be appropriation of likeness for which
decedent's family could recover); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. City
1893) (publication of plaintiff's picture in newspaper for a popularity contest of a most embarrassing
kind held to be an invasion of plaintiffs right to privacy); MacKenzie v. Sodin Mineral Springs Co.,
27 Abb. N. Cas. 402, 18 N.Y.S. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) (unauthorized use of facsimile of physi-
cian's signature to sell medicine held to be appropriation)).
63. Id. (citing Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899)).
64. Id. at 850 (citing Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902)). The decision in Roberson was received with much animosity, which led to the unprece-
dented action of one of the judges publishing a law review article in defense of the decision. Id. at
850 (citing O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 437 (1902)).
The New York legislature responded to the Roberson decision by enacting laws protecting pri-
vacy rights. Id. (citing 1903 N.Y. Laws, ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (codified as amended at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1921) (designed to protect against what is now known as the tort of
appropriation). This New York Act was upheld as constitutional. Id. at 850 n. 13 (citing Rhodes v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097 (1908), aff'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911).
Other states, including Oklahoma, have enacted statutes protecting privacy rights. d. at 851
(citing NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -211, 25-804.01 (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1 to
.3 (West 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-401 to -406 (1953); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-377 to -386 (1950);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983)).
65. Id. at 851.
66. The only state which continues to refuse recovery in tort for claims based solely upon inva-
sion of privacy is Rhode Island. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 56, at 851.
67. Protection of a person's general right to privacy is for the most part left to the individual
states. The United States Constitution also protects personal privacy from government invasion.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
68. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
69. "The Congress finds that.. . the right of privacy is a personal and fundamental right
protected by the Constitution of the United States." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 1977) (Congressional
Findings and Statement of Purpose, Pub. L. No. 93-579, section 2).
70. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
71. The decision was a 5-4 plurality.
8
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osophical basis for the constitutional right to privacy. Justice Douglas
announced that the right to privacy exists in the penumbras of the first,
third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments.72 Justice Goldberg stated that
the ninth amendment, while not directly creating rights, authorizes the
Court to identify fundamental personal rights not specifically enumer-
ated in the first eight amendments.7" Justice Harlan, while recognizing
the right to privacy, failed to find that right in the Constitution, but
rather found it to exist within natural law.7'
Evolution of the law regarding privacy rights has traced the law of
defamation. The actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van 75 was extended to false light invasion of privacy claims involving
public officials and public figures in Time, Inc. v. Hill.76 The court in
Hill applied the Sullivan standard to false light claims, but left unan-
swered the scope of protection in matters involving the private lives of
private citizens. This question was partially answered in Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn.77 The Supreme Court in Cohn held that the first
amendment prohibits a state from imposing tort liability for invasion of
privacy from the broadcast of a rape victim's identity where such infor-
mation is part of court records open to the public.78 The Court left the
scope of privacy rights of private citizens open for future cases by hold-
ing that states may protect privacy rights of the individual by prohibiting
public disclosure of private matters if the prohibition is by means which
avoid public documentation or other disclosure of private information.7 9
The Cohn case did not address the applicability of Hill to non-false light
privacy claims.
The standard enunciated in the Hill case may soon become inappli-
72. 381 U.S. at 484.
73. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
74. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
75. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). A public official can recover damages for defamation only where the
defamatory statement was made with "'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80. "Actual malice" is a term of
art and is broader than spite or ill will. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 634 n.21.
76. 385 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1967); see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)
(actual malice standard in defamation actions extended to private persons where newsworthy matter
involved). But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (overruled Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.).
77. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
78. Id. at 491. The Court in Cohn was clearly balancing the right to privacy against the first
amendment freedom of the press. Id. at 490-91. It is still unclear how the Court would hold if the
information made public was not already part of the public record.
79. Id. at 489-90. See generally Phillips, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and the Constitu-
tional Standard of Care, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 77 (1975) (discussion of the development of
privacy law in relation to defamation claims).
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cable to invasion of privacy actions. The Supreme Court held in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 10 that any standard of care may be applied by the
states to determine liability in libel actions brought by private persons so
long as strict liability is not imposed."1 The Supreme Court has not yet
determined whether Gertz applies to invasion of privacy claims brought
by private persons, but it is quite possible that Gertz will be applied to
privacy claims just as Sullivan was applied to false light claims through
Hill.
a. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The unreasonable and highly offensive intrusion upon the seclusion
of another is one of the four torts within the sphere of invasion of pri-
vacy.82 Two elements must be shown in order to recover for intrusion
upon seclusion:
1. an intentional intrusion upon another's solitude, seclusion, or pri-
vate affairs or concerns8 3 and;
2. the intrusion is one that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.84
Recovery for intrusion upon seclusion is not dependent upon publicity
given to the person whose interests have been interfered with, rather lia-
bility results from the interference itself.8 5 Arguably therefore, the con-
stitutional restrictions of Sullivan and Gertz are inapplicable to this
tort.
8 6
Oklahoma adopted the Restatement approach for privacy claims in
Munley v. ISC Financial House, Inc. 87 The Munley case involved an
alleged violation of privacy rights through a creditor's actions to collect a
80. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
81. Id at 347-48.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 652B (1977).
83. Id comment c (1977).
84. I d; see Munley v. ISC Financial House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978); Froelich v.
Werkin, 219 Kan. 461, 548 P.2d 482 (1976); McClain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 271 Or. 549, 533 P.2d
343 (1975); Everett v. Carvel Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 734, 334 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1972).
85. See generally Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (photographing plain-
tiff in his home without his knowledge or consent); Thompson v. Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (search of home without warrant); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673,
110 S.E.2d 716 (1959) (illegal search of woman's shopping bag in a store); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125
Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (landlord moving in on tenant); Young v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co.,
39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929) (search of a home without a warrant); Byfield v. Chandler, 33
Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1924) (breaking into woman's bedroom on a steamboat); De May v.
Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881) (iAtruding upon childbirth).
86. Phillips supra note 79, at 99. However, the constitutional standard of care in Sullivan and
Gertz could be applicable to the conduct of the defendant in intrusion upon seclusion actions by
analogy. Id
87. 584 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978).
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bad debt.8" The court found that the posting of notes on plaintiff's door,
phone calls and visits to plaintiff by defendant's agents regarding pay-
ment of a debt legitimately owed to defendant by plaintiff, did not action-
ably intrude upon plaintiff's seclusion. 9 This conduct was not found to
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.90
To support her claim for intrusion upon seclusion, Guinn intro-
duced evidence that the Elders personally confronted her at least three
times regarding her relationship with Pat Sharp.9 The discussion at
these meetings centered around Guinn's sexual relationship with
Sharp.92 It is the Elders' belief, according to the Bible, that sexual rela-
tions among persons not married to one another is sinful.93 The Elders
believe the purpose of the meetings with Guinn was to save her soul.94
Several cases have held that giving publicity to one's sexual conduct
is an intrusion upon one's private affairs of a kind that is highly offensive
to a reasonable person.95 Guinn asserts that the Elders' intrusions and
subsequent disclosure of private matters were of a nature which are
highly offensive. The defendants assert that the Elders' conduct was not
of a type that is highly offensive to a reasonable person because such
conduct was required as part of the Elders' duty to watch over the con-
gregation.96 The defendants also argue that their acts were privileged
because, as a member of the Church, Guinn accepted the rules thereof,
including Church disciplinary procedure.97
b. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Three elements must be shown in order to recover damages under
the Restatement for public disclosure of private facts. There must be
publicity given to the private life of the plaintiff which is highly offensive
to a reasonable person and not of legitimate concern to the public.98
88. Id. at 1337-38.
89. Id. at 1340.
90. Id.
91. Brief for Appellee at 2-5, Guinn.
92. Id.
93. See id at 4.
94. Brief for Appellants at 10-11, Guinn.
95. Garner v. Triangle Pub., Inc., 97 F.Supp. 546 (S.D. N.Y. 1951); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.
285, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); cf. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F.Supp. 352
(S.D. N.Y. 1939); Howard v. Des Moines Register and Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979),
cert denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); Myers v. U.S. Camera Pub. Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1957).
96. Brief for Appellants at 54, 4, Guinn.
97. See id. at 21.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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The publicity requirement for privacy claims differs from the publi-
cation requirement for defamation claims. The publication requirement
is satisfied by any communication to any third person by the defendant.
The publicity requirement, however, is satisfied only if the matter is
"substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."'99
Additionally, the publicized matter must be of a kind that would be
highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man.'" Minor and moderate
annoyances are not sufficient to give rise to a cause of action.' 1 The
publicity must be such that a reasonable person would feel seriously ag-
grieved thereby.0 2 Further, the facts must involve the private life of the
plaintiff."°3 Private facts are those that the plaintiff wishes to keep to
himself and reveals, if at all, only to family or close personal friends."w
Finally, the public must not have a legitimate interest in having
knowledge of the matter publicized.' 0 The Cohn case'06 has limited the
importance of this requirement, as any matter which is part of the public
record may be publicized without resulting in liability. 0 7 This require-
ment is still important in cases involving matter which is not part of
public record.
Oklahoma follows the Restatement approach for claims involving
public disclosure of private facts. 108 The Munley case involved a claim
for public disclosure of private facts in addition to the claim for intrusion
upon seclusion." 9 The court did not discuss the separate elements of the
cause of action in reaching their decision, but merely ruled that the Re-
statement approach precluded recovery. H °
99. See Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978); Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962); Schwartz v. Thiele, 242 Cal. App. 2d 799, 51 Cal. Rptr. 767
(1966); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
100. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976);
Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Emerson v. J.F. Shea Co., 76 Cal. App. 3d 579,
143 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1978); Cabiness v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966); LaForge v.
Fairchild Pubs., 23 A.D.2d 636, 257 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1965).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 652 D comment c (1977).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 652 D (1977).
104. Ia
105. Id. See generally Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977); Virgil v. Time, Inc.,
527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975); Bereshy v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (1978);
Hollander v. Lubow, 277 Md. 47, 351 A.2d 421 (1976) (general discussion on legitimate public
concerns).
106. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
107. Id. at 490-91.
108. Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Okla. 1978).
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court again addressed the Restatement cri-
teria for public disclosure of private facts in McCormack v. Oklahoma
Publishing Co. "' The court in McCormack held that a newspaper article
disclosing the criminal record of a "one-time gambler and illegal casino
operator" did not give rise to a cause of action for public disclosure of
private facts. 1 2 The court specifically found that the matter publicized
was already public, not highly offensive to a reasonable person and that
the plaintiff had made no allegation that the publicized matter was of no
legitimate concern to the public.' 13
The Munley and McCormack decisions represent the body of pri-
vacy law in Oklahoma. Unfortunately, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has not elaborated on the criteria for recovery. Although the Restate-
ment criteria were fully adopted in McCormack,"4 the application of
these criteria remains uncertain. For example, it is uncertain whether
the court in McCormack intended to include the qualified privilege de-
fenses when it adopted the Restatement approach to privacy claims.1
15
Guinn's cause of action for public disclosure of private facts centers
around the letters which were read to the Collinsville congregation and
mailed to four churches in the surrounding area which the defendants
maintain had an interest in the letters' contents." 6 These letters con-
tained matter regarding the private life of Marian Guinn" 7 and scrip-
tural citations to support the Elders' decision to withdraw fellowship
from Guinn.18
The defendants claim that the publicity requirement was not met for
at least two reasons. First, the defendants assert that the publicity re-
quirement was not met because the right to privacy recognizes the right
to be free from only unwarranted publicity." 9 "Any intrusion into the
privacy of the appellee [plaintiff] resulted from her own conduct which
was sinful and contrary to the religious teachings of the church."' 120 The
111. 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980).
112. Id. at 741.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 740. The Court also held that OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 3 ("Any person who suffers
detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a
compensation therefor in money, which is called damages.") allows the acceptance of new torts not
yet recognized when Oklahoma adopted the common law. Id
115. See infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
116. Brief for Appellants at 11, 57-61, Guinn.
117. Brief for Appellee at 7, Guinn.
118. Id.
119. Brief for Appellants at 53, Guinn.
120. Id. at 54.
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Elders' actions could be viewed as warranted since they were apparently
acting in accordance with the disciplinary process spelled out in
Matthew.
Second, the defendants argue that the disclosure of the contents of
the letter to the congregation was a disclosure to a limited and defined
number of people and not to the public at large.121 However, it is gener-
ally recognized that the publicity requirement is met where the disclosed
matter is substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.
122
The second letter was read to the congregation during Sunday worship
services.123 The entire congregation of approximately 125 persons1 4 was
present in the Church when the second letter was read. It is not known if
there were any visitors in the Church at the time the second letter was
read. Collinsville, Oklahoma had a population of approximately 2,200 in
1981.125 Therefore, almost 6% of the population of the town was present
at the Church when the second letter was read. Although the publicity
requirement for privacy claims is more difficult to meet than the publica-
tion requirement for defamation claims, it is arguable that the scandalous
contents of the second letter were substantially certain to become public
knowledge in such a small town.
Finally, the defendants claim that the disclosure by the Elders is
privileged as a communication made in an official capacity to those with
a common interest 12 6 and therefore warranted publicity.127 The defend-
ants argue that the matter disclosed in the letter was of legitimate con-
cern to the members of the congregation since they all shared a common
interest in the spiritual well being of Marian Guinn. 128 "The common
interest of members of religious ... associations ... is recognized as
sufficient to support a privilege for communications among themselves
concerning... misconduct of some other member that makes him unde-
sirable for continued membership." '129
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Guinn's final claim was for the intentional infliction of emotional
121. See id at 11.
122. See cases cited supra at note 100.
123. Brief for Appellants at 11, Guinn.
124. Id at 2.
125. Id at 8.
126. Brief for Appellants at 57-58, Guinn. See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
127. IdL at 53, 62.
128. I at 57-62.
129. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 596 comment e (1977).
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distress. 3 ' The law regarding recovery for this tort is still in the devel-
opmental stage, and the courts have been slow to accept the interest in
being free from the intentional infliction of mental anguish as a protected
right. 131
There are basically three reasons why courts have been reluctant to
allow recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. First, it
has been argued, damages are difficult to determine. 132 This argument
was advanced during the mid-nineteenth century but is no longer ac-
cepted today. Damages for mental suffering are no more difficult to esti-
mate than damages for physical suffering, which have never been denied
compensation. 133 Second, it was argued that mental and emotional con-
sequences are so uncertain that they cannot be anticipated, and therefore
cannot be the proximate result of a defendant's conduct.134 This view
was recognized in the late nineteenth century but has also been rejected.
Medical science has long recognized that fright, shock, grief, anxiety,
rage and shame very often have real physical effects upon the body.
135
Third, it was feared that recognition of the cause of action would result
in a flood of fictitious and trivial claims. 136 However, this is an argument
that has been made against all advances in tort law. The purpose of the
law is to provide a remedy for those injured by unlawful conduct. The
courts must often rely on common sense to distinguish fictitious and triv-
ial claims from meritorious ones.
The early cases awarded damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress when common carriers 37 innkeepers138 and public utili-
130. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
131. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 56, at 54. The classic article on the subject is
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. Rv. 1033 (1936).
132. "[M]ental distress alone is too remote and difficult of measurement to be the subject of an
assessment of damages." Gatzon v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 20, 81 N.W. 1003, 1009 (1900). See
generally Magruder, supra note 131, at 1033.
133. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 56, at 55.
134. Id. [I]t cannot be said that [the defendants'] manner, language, or gestures, or declared
purpose. . . were naturally and reasonably calculated to, or it might be anticipated they would,
produce the peculiar injury sustained by [the plaintiff]." Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, -, 51 N.E.
657, 664 (1898); "[P]laintiff cannot recover for injuries occasioned by fright, as there was no immedi-
ate personal injury." Mitchell v. Rochester Rwy. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, -, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896).
135. W. PROSSER & W. KETON, supra note 56, at 56 (citing Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance
as Legal Damage, 20 MicH. L. REv. 497, 498-99 (1922)).
136. Id. (citing Magruder, supra note 131, at 1035).
137. Id. at 57 (citing St. Louis-San Francisco ILR. Co. v. Clark, 104 Okla. 24, 229 P. 779 (1924);
Bleecker v. Colorado & So. -KR. Co., 50 Colo. 140, 114 P. 481 (1911); Knoxville Traction Co. v.
Lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899); Cole v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. Co., 102 Ga. 474, 31 S.E.
107 (1897)).
138. Id. at 58 (citing Milner Hotels v. Dougherty, 195 Miss. 718, 15 So. 2d 358 (1943); Dixon v.
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ties139 insulted or threatened their customers. Liability in those cases
was based upon the "higher duty" owed by those defendants to their
customers and not upon the plaintiff's interest in being free from unrea-
sonable and outrageous mental anguish. 14
A current statement of the law regarding the intentional infliction of
emotional distress is compiled in the Restatement.1 41  The Restatement
provides for recovery where severe emotional distress is intentionally or
recklessly caused by extreme and outrageous conduct of the defend-
ant.142 Although some jurisdictions, including Oklahoma, have held to
the contrary,14 3 the Restatement approach does not require a showing of
physical injury independent from the mental or emotional injury in order
to justify recovery for such mental or emotional injury. 14 Liability does
not extend, however, to "insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities." 145
The seminal case illustrating extreme and outrageous conduct is
Wilkinson v. Downton.146 The defendant amused himself by telling the
plaintiff that her husband had just been seriously injured in an accident
when such was not true. 47 Plaintiff believed the defendant's false state-
ments and suffered serious and permanent physical injuries as a result. 148
The court held that an act committed by the defendant which is meant to
cause harm to the plaintiff infringes upon the plaintiff's legal right to
personal safety, and plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant
for such an act.1 49
Cases after Wilkinson rested recovery wherever possible upon more
familiar grounds.150 By about 1930, so many cases of extreme and outra-
Hotel Tutwiler Op. Co., 214 Ala. 396, 108 So. 2d (1926); Freman v. Page, 238 Mass. 499, 131 N.E.
475 (1921).
139. Id. (citing Buchanon v. Western Union Tel. Co., 115 S.C. 433, 106 S.E. 159 (1920); Dunn v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907); Magnirk v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79
Miss. 632, 31 So. 206 (1902)).
140. Id. at 57-59.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
142. Id.
143. See Jines v. City of Norman, 351 P.2d 1048 (Okla. 1960); Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154
Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P.2d 330 (1943).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment k (1977).
145. Id. comment d (1977).
146. [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
147. Id. at 57.
148. Id at 58.
149. Id. at 58-9.
150. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 56, at 60 (citing Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765,
229 S.W. 967 (1927) (invasion of privacy); Salisbury v. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 P. 315 (1918)
(false imprisonment); Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 148 Mo. App. 462, 129 S.W. 401 (1910)
(trespass to land); Kurpgeweit, v. Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177 (1910) (assault); Shellabarger v.
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geous conduct had appeared that the courts began to treat extreme and
outrageous infliction of emotional distress as a separate and distinct
cause of action.
1 5 1
The nature of a defendant's conduct may become extreme and out-
rageous where he abuses some relation or position he occupies with re-
spect to the plaintiff. 52 Such conduct can be analogized to extortion.
1 53
Mere insults or annoyances, however, are not actionable in these cases
unless extreme and outrageous in and of themselves.
154
The plaintiff must also show that the defendant's conduct was inten-
tional or reckless. 1 5 The conduct is intentional where "the actor desires
to inflict severe emotional distress" 15 6 or where "[the actor] knows that
such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his con-
duct." 7 The conduct is reckless where the actor acts "in deliberate dis-
regard of a high probability that emotional distress will follow."
158
A plaintiff can recover damages only where the resulting emotional
distress is severe.15 9 Severe emotional distress includes "all highly un-
pleasant mental reactions."'" The law provides a remedy where the dis-
tress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it.161 In some cases, the extreme and outrageous nature of the
defendant's conduct is alone enough to show that severe emotional dis-
tress would result.' 62 Other cases have required that physical injury re-
sult from the emotional distress before recovery will be allowed.
1 63
Oklahoma law regarding the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress is a variation on the Restatement theme. No recovery will be al-
lowed unless the emotional distress is produced by, connected with, or
the result of physical suffering or injury to the plaintiff.1" Even when
this requirement can be satisfied the court must initially determine
Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S.W. 1005 (1905) (nuisance); De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9
N.W. 146 (1881) (battery)).
151. Id. at 60.
152. Id. at 61; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment e (1977).
153. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 56, at 61.
154. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment e (1977).




159. Id. comment i; eg., Breeden v. League Serv. Corp., 575 P.2d 1374, 1377-78 (Okla. 1978).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1977).
161. Id.; ag., 575 P.2d at 1378.
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1977).
163. Id.; see cases cited supra note 143.
164. Jines v. City of Norman, 351 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Okla. 1960).
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whether the actor's conduct was extreme and outrageous before it may
consider whether severe emotional distress resulted.16 The effect of
these requirements is that obtaining recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in Oklahoma is quite difficult.
Guinn's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based
upon the actions of the Elders both before and after Guinn wrote the
letter stating that she withdrew her membership from the Church.'66
Guinn testified that after her meetings with the Elders she was unable to
sleep and became physically ill. 167 Guinn also testified that she suffered
from hypoglycemia which condition worsened when she became upset or
was under stress. 168
Before Guinn's injuries can be considered, however, it must be de-
termined whether the Elders' actions were extreme and outrageous.1 69
In order to be considered extreme and outrageous under Oklahoma law,
the defendant's conduct "must be so extreme in degree as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community."'1 0 The extreme and outrageous
conduct required may arise from the abuse of a position of actual or
apparent authority which the defendant enjoys over the plaintiff. 17 Both
the Elders and Guinn understood the role of the Elders in the congrega-
tion. 172 The Elders' responsibility to watch over the members of the con-
gregation placed them in a position of actual authority with respect to
the congregation.
The Elders' conduct must constitute an extreme and outrageous
abuse of their authority in order to be actionable. The Elders claim their
authority directly from the Bible. Because they were apparently acting
according to the disciplinary process spelled out in Matthew,173 the El-
ders believe that their authority was clearly spelled out. The Elders
165. Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983)
(applying Oklahoma law); cf Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1982) (aggra-
vation need not be severe or outrageous to be actionable where mental suffering is but one item of
damage resulting from defendant's conduct). See generally Breeden v. League Serv. Corp., 575 P.2d
1374 (Okla. 1978) (conduct must be so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community).
166. Brief for Appellee at 31-32, Guinn.
167. Id. at 5.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
170. Breeden, 575 P.2d at 1376.
171. Id. at 1377.
172. Testimony of Marian Guinn, Trial Transcript at 148 and Testimony of Ron Witten, Trial
Transcript at 272, Guinn.
173. Matthew 18: 15-17; see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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could meet with Guinn individually and then collectively. When Guinn
did not repent they could then threaten to tell her sins to the Church and
withdraw fellowship from her. Guinn alleges that the Elders abused
their authority by repeatedly harrassing her.174 The defendants contend
that the Elders conduct was not extreme and outrageous since the Elders
acted within the scriptural disciplinary process, thus not abusing their
position of authority. 17
5
The issue as to whether Guinn's damages for emotional distress
meet the Oklahoma requirement that physical injury accompany the
emotional injury is a fact question which is within the realm of the jury
and will generally not be reviewed on appeal. The trial court jury did
determine that Guinn suffered physical consequences as a result of the
Elders' conduct.
B. Affirmative Defenses Advanced By the Church and Elders
The defendants have advanced two affirmative defenses to the claims
brought by Guinn. First, the defendants assert that the courts do not
have subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving purely ecclesiastical
matters. '6 The defendants allege that by assuming jurisdiction in this
case both the first amendment and the Oklahoma Constitution177 have
been violated. 7 ' Second, the defendants argue that the Elders' actions
come within a qualified privilege.17 9
1. Free Exercise of Religion
The first amendment contains two separate and distinct clauses to
protect religious freedom. 80 The establishment clause prohibits any law
174. Brief for Appellee at 32-34, Guinn.
175. Brief for Appellants at 42-45, Guinn.
176. Id. at 17, Guinn.
177. See supra note 3.
178. Brief for Appellants at 14-36, 41, Guinn.
179. Id. at 54-60.
180. The two clauses are, as a practical matter, in conflict. This conflict between the Establish-
ment and Free Exercise clauses has been addressed at length by the courts and commentators. See
Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Empl. See. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); see L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 812; Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PrrT. L. REV. 673 (1980); Gianella, Religions Liberty, Nonestablish-
ment and Doctrinal Development Part II, the Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513
(1968); Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217
(1966).
The current approach taken by the courts is one of increasing accomodation of religion. Com-
pare Zorach v. Clanson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1948)
(doctrine of benevolent neutrality) with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (zones of required
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"respecting an establishment of religion." 181  The free exercise clause
bans any law "prohibiting the free exercise of religion."' 182 The purpose
of the religion clauses is to protect the freedom of every individual to
worship. 18 3
The free exercise clause is violated where government action or reg-
ulation places a substantial burden upon a religious belief or conduct. 184
Such regulations will be upheld only where there is a compelling state
interest and the regulation is the least restrictive means of accomplishing
that interest1 85 The accommodation approach dictates that if an exemp-
tion can be given to those whose religious beliefs are burdened by the
regulation without adversely affecting the state interest advanced, such
accommodation) and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (affirmative duty, beyond mere toler-
ance, to accommodate religious beliefs).
The Free Exercise Clause should be dominant in any conflict with the Establishment Clause. L.
TRiBE, supra note 9 at 833.
181. U.S. CONsr. amend. I. The current Supreme Court approach to Establishment clause is in
a state of flux. The traditional tripartite test was delivered in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). The Court has applied the tripartite test to determine whether a particular government
activity is permissible or impermissible under the Establishment clause: (1) Does the government
activity have a secular purpose? (2) Does the government activity have the primary effect of neither
advancing nor inhibiting religion? (3) Will the government activity avoid excessive entanglement
with religion? The challenged activity must pass all three prongs of the tripartite test. Id. at 612-13;
see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (secular purpose and primary effect
tests); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (entanglement test).
The Lemon test, although almost universally used by the Supreme Court, was attacked by Jus-
tice Burger in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The future of the tripartite test is unclear,
but previous attempts by commentators to reject the tripartate test have been unsuccessful. See
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cni. L. REv. 1 (1961) (neutrality
theory); Choper, supra note 180, at 673 (voluntarism theory). See generally Lacey, The Struggle
Over Deregulation of Religiously Affiliated Institutions: 4 Classic Internal First Amendment Conflict,
26 ARiz. L. REv. 615, 644-59 (1984) (discussion of establishment clause tests).
182. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The early cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause distinguished
between religious beliefs and religious conduct. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." Id. at 164.
The modem cases have reaffirmed the absolute prohibition against government interference
with religious beliefs, but religiously motivated activities are subject to regulation under the states'
police power where the health, safety, and welfare of society are adversely affected by such activity.
See I NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTONAL LAW 1057-63 (2d ed. 1983). See infra
notes 184-86 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the current Free Exercise Clause test ap-
plied by the Supreme Court).
183. L. TIsnm, supra note 9, at 812-13 nn.4-5 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1962) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(dictum).
Both religion clauses of the first amendment are applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. The Free Exercise Clause was first applied to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940). The Establishment Clause was first applied to the states in the landmark case of
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
184. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
185. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
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an exemption must be given.' 86
a. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The courts have been reluctant to settle disputes involving internal
church affairs.' 87 This hesitance of the courts to become involved in ec-
clesiastical issues is based in part upon the difficulty in mastering church
"law" and terminology.188 The Supreme Court has held that ecclesiasti-
cal decisions should not be subject to review by the courts. 189 Interven-
tion by the courts in matters of church doctrine constitutes an
impermissible entanglement between church and state in violation of the
first amendment.' 90
Most of the cases presented to the courts have involved disputes
over church property' 91 or membership.'92 A conflict of fundamental
rights occurs, however, when an ecclesiastical decision deprives a person
of their civil and personal rights:
[O]nce the stakes intersect the civil realm and implicate significant sec-
ular interests in property or personal liberty, governmental interven-
tion in cases of evident overreaching becomes the only alternative to an
otherwise unacceptable choice between perpetuating internal domina-
tion and inviting resolution by open force. In such cases the best that
constitutional doctrine can achieve is to constrain the grounds on
which courts act, instructing them above all to avoid modes of decision
186. See id.
187. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 877-78 (citing Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1967); Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. 679 (1871) (in matters purely religious or ecclesiastical, the civil courts have no jurisdiction)).
See generally itL at 870-82.
188. This statement is an oversimplification of the issue. Jurisdiction of civil courts in religious
disputes is a complicated area of the law which cannot be adequately discussed within the scope of
this Note. For an in depth discussion of this issue, see Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over
the Use of Church Property, 75 HARv. L. RPv. 1142 (1962); cf Comment, The Internal Affairs of
Associationsfor Profit, 43 HAIRv. L. Rlv. 993 (1930).
189. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871).
190. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 871. The Bible also addresses this issue:
And when Gallio was the deputy of Achaia, the Jews made insurrection. . . against Paul,
and brought him to the judgment seat, saying, This fellow persuadeth men to worship God
contrary to the law. And when Paul was now about to open his mouth, Gallio said unto
the Jews, If it were a matter of wrong or wicked lewdness, 0 ye Jews, reason would that I
should bear with you: But if it be a question of words and names, and of your law, look ye
to it; for I will be no judge of such matters. And he drave them from the judgment seat.
Acts 18:12-16.
191. See Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); see also Note, supra note 188. See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 9, 865-880.
192. See Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 9, 865-880.
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that involve resolving by law issues of religious faith or doctrine.1 93
The rights of the individual are thus weighed against the rights of the
Church. Religiously motivated conduct is protected by the free exercise
clause, but should be subject to regulation when in conflict with the civil
and personal rights of others. 194
The subject matter jurisdiction issue in Guinn centers around the
implementation of Church discipline as spelled out in Matthew.195
Church discipline is most certainly an ecclesiastical matter over which
the courts do not normally have jurisdiction. 196 A problem arises in this
case because the civil and personal rights of Marian Guinn came into
conflict with the process of administering that discipline. Guinn argues
that the courts are free to assume jurisdiction over religious activities
whenever a person's civil rights are violated. 197 The defendants assert
that allowing recovery for Guinn is a government action which places a
substantial burden upon their religious beliefs and conduct, and that pro-
tecting privacy rights of an individual is not a compelling state interest
sufficient to defeat their religious rights.1 9 The decision in this case is
unconstitutional, the defendants argue, because it regulates scriptural
church discipline which is clearly an ecclesiastical matter.1 99
2. Qualified Privilege in Tort
The Church and Elders have raised the defense of qualified privilege
against Guinn's claims for invasion of privacy.2" This defense has its
origin in the Restatement.20° The Restatement borrows the defense of
qualified privilege from the law of defamation and applies it to privacy
193. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 882.
194. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & . YOUNG, supra note 182, at 1057-63.
195. Matthew 18:15-17; see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. An issue related to
whether the courts have subject matter jurisdiction in the Guinn case is Marian Guinn's associa-
tional rights. The defendants assert that all conduct of the Elders is privileged because Guinn will
always be a member of the Church and cannot unilaterally terminate her membership. The trial
court instructed the jury that Guirn had the right to terminate her membership with the Church at
any time, an instruction which the defendants are contesting. Brief for Appellants at 39, Guinn.
Further, the defendants argue that even if Guinn effectively withdrew her membership from the
congregation, the Elders still had the right to tell her sins to the Church because such communica-
tions are privileged as between persons with a common interest. See infra notes 200-12 and accom-
panying text (a discussion of the qualified privilege defense). For an in depth review of the current
law regarding associational rights see Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1878 (1984).
196. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
197. Brief for Appellee at 11-15, Guinn.
198. Brief for Appellants at 54-60, Guinn.
199. Id. at 19-25.
200. Id at 54-62.
201. RES TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652G (1977).
[Vol. 21:157
22




There are several types of qualified or conditional privileges applica-
ble to defamation actions.2 3 The defendants in the Guinn case rely upon
what is known as the common interest privilege. The common interest
privilege precludes liability for statements made by and between persons
entitled to share such information.2" A comment in the Restatement
section regarding the common interest privilege specifically states that
the common interest of members of religious groups is sufficient to sup-
port a claim of privilege.20" It is important to note that the common
interest must exist between the members of the group and that the inter-
est of the injured party is irrelevant.206
It is unclear whether the law of qualified privilege for defamation
claims has been extended to privacy claims in Oklahoma. The defend-
ants in the Guinn case indicate that the general Restatement approach for
invasion of privacy claims has been accepted by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court.2 7 The defendants argue that Oklahoma should adopt the Re-
statement rule regarding qualified privilege in privacy actions since some
intrusions are clearly warranted.2 "8
The defendants also rely upon the fact that Kansas has applied the
law of qualified privilege to privacy claims.20 9 In Munsell v. Ideal Food
Stores210 the Kansas Supreme Court held that inquiries by the manage-
ment of a food store regarding an employee's falsification of expense and
pay records, and the somewhat coerced confession of the employee to
management came within a qualified privilege and were therefore not ac-
tionable as an invasion of the employee's privacy.21'
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court should decide to adopt the Restate-
202. Id. "Under any circumstances that would give rise to a conditional privilege for the publi-
cation of defamation, there is likewise a conditional privilege for the invasion of privacy." Id. com-
ment a.
203. Protection of the publisher's interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 (1977).
Protection of interest of recipient or a third person. Id. § 595. Common interest. Id. § 596. Com-
munication to one who may act in the public interest. Id § 596. Family relationship. Id § 597.
Communication by inferior state officers. Id § 598A.
204. IM. § 596.
205. Id. comment e. See Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F.2d 742 (D.C. 1934); Rankin v. Philippe, 206 Pa.
Super. 27,211 A.2d 56 (1965); Creswell v. Pruitt, 239 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Slocinski v.
Radwan, 83 N.H. 501, 144 A. 787 (1929).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (1977).
207. Brief for Appellants at 50, Guinn (citing McCormack v. Oklahoma Pubs. Co., 613 P.2d 737
(Okla. 1980)).
208. Id. at 50-60.
209. Id. at 52-54 (citing Munsel v. Ideal Ford Stores, 208 Kan. 909, 494 P.2d 1063 (1972)).
210. 208 Kan. 909, 494 P.2d 1063 (1972).
211. IaL at -, 494 P.2d at 1073.
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ment approach for qualified privilege in privacy actions, the defendants'
claim of privilege could be successful. The members of the Collinsville
congregation arguably share a common interest in the spiritual well being
of Marian Guinn within the meaning of the Restatement. Whether the
acts of the defendants come within the common interest qualified privi-
lege may become the pivotal question on appeal. It should be noted that
a qualified privilege is lost if there is an abuse of that privilege.212 How-
ever, abuse of privilege in privacy actions has not been addressed by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPACT OF THE DECISION ON APPEAL
The positions of the parties in Guinn are both quite strong. The
outcome on appeal will rest upon how the Oklahoma Supreme Court
applies existing law to the new factual issues presented by this case.
With regard to her claims for intrusion upon seclusion and public
disclosure of private facts, Guinn has arguably established a prima facie
case. The evidence presented at trial and the law cited by the parties
does seem to support the jury's finding that Guinn's privacy rights were
violated. The only element of these torts which seems questionable in
this case is the requirement that the defendants' actions be of a type that
are highly offensive to a reasonable person. The Elders advance their
subjective belief that they acted with Guinn's best interests at heart and
in accordance with their responsibility as Elders, therefore their actions
could not be viewed as highly offensive to a reasonable person. However,
whether the Elder's actions were highly offensive to a reasonable person
is an objective question to be determined by the jury.
The defendants have asserted affirmative defenses to Guinn's claims
which could preclude recovery. First, the defendants contend that this
case should not be before the courts because it involves the determination
of church discipline, which is purely an ecclesiastical matter beyond the
jurisdiction of any court. Guinn has asserted a counter argument that
jurisdiction may be assumed over church affairs where the civil and per-
sonal rights of another person have been violated.
Second, defendants have argued that the disclosure upon which
Guinn bases her claim for public disclosure of private facts is subject to a
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 (1977). The privilege can be lost for publication
of defamatory rumor, Id. § 602; action beyond scope and purpose of the privilege, Id. §§ 603, 605;
excessive publication, Id § 604; publication of unprivileged matter in addition to the privileged mat-
ter, Id § 605A.
[Vol. 21:157
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common interest qualified privilege. Although Oklahoma has adopted
the Restatement approach to privacy claims, it is not clear whether the
law of qualified privilege therein has also been adopted. If the Oklahoma
Supreme Court does affirmatively adopt the Restatement qualified privi-
lege approach for privacy claims on appeal, Guinn's judgment for public
disclosure of private facts may be reversed.
With regard to Guinn's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, it is more difficult to affirm the judgment below. It is less likely
that a cause of action will be sustained under Oklahoma law than under
the Restatement approach. Given that the Elders were arguably acting
within the scope of their authority, it is difficult to establish that their
actions rose to the level of being intentional or reckless, and extreme and
outrageous. Guinn has argued in response that the Elders abused their
position of authority and that their actions were indeed extreme and out-
rageous, as well as intentional or reckless.
The issues in Guinn boil down to a confrontation between the guar-
anteed constitutional rights of the litigants. On the one hand there is
Marian Guinn's right to privacy. Should that right extend to protect
individuals from all types of exposure to their private lives? On the other
hand there is the defendants' right to exercise their religious beliefs.
Should free exercise rights preclude the courts from regulating any mat-
ter involving religious doctrine, especially those involving church disci-
pline? This confrontation between these fundamental constitutional
rights cannot easily be resolved.
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court determines that Guinn should not
have recovered, as a matter of law, on any of her claims, some extremists
will no doubt argue that religious groups will be free to act in the name of
religion with total disregard for the rights of others. Predictions of a new
type of religious persecution may well follow the opinion of one commen-
tator who recently remarked "[tihere was a time when religion ruled the
world-it is known as the Dark Ages." 213
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirms the decision below with re-
spect to one or more of Guinn's claims, some extremists on the other end
of the spectrum will likely complain that parishioners who have violated
the rules of a religion or religious congregation will sue the congregation
whenever the violator is disciplined, whether such discipline is applied in
accordance with established disciplinary procedures or not. The result, it
213. Cahan, The Laws of Religion and Society Meet on Common Ground at the Center for
Church/State Studies, STUDENT LAW. 51 (Mar. 1985) (quoting Ruth Hurmence Green).
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may be argued, will be the total revocation of the power of religious con-
gregations to deal with matters of internal discipline, leading to state con-
trol of religion.
A more reasonable view of the decision on appeal will be to treat the
opinion as the beginning of a painstaking process of defining how the
constitutional rights to privacy and free exercise of religion shall interre-
late. The outcome in Guinn will address but one facet of this compli-
cated relationship. In the realm of constitutionally protected freedoms
no single right has priority to the exclusion of any others. Courts should
balance these rights when they come in conflict so as to make new law
which will best serve society. The decision on appeal in Guinn will repre-
sent the culmination of such a balancing process and will serve as a foun-
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